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timistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the
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“Life’s battles don’t always go to the stronger or faster man. But sooner or later
the man who wins, is the man who thinks he can.”
Vince Lombardi (American Football Coach, 1913-1970)
Steve Jobs, the CEO of Apple Inc. is perhaps the most prominent recent example of how
important a top executive is to the success of a company. When over the course of 2009
concerns about Mr. Jobs’s health grew among investors, the company’s stock price took
a rollercoaster ride as health speculation intensiﬁed. While Apple Inc. has a deep bench
of senior managers, Mr. Jobs apparently was considered indispensable to the company’s
lasting prosperity.1
In the academic literature on the subject, the importance of the top executive’s per-
son(ality) was already stressed by Drucker (1967) and recently various empirical studies
have established that there seems to be a strong connection between individual managers’
attitudes and corporate policies. The studies by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen et
al. (2007), Kaplan et al. (2008), and Graham et al. (2008) show that the person(ality) of a
top-executive has in itself substantial inﬂuence on her or his ﬁrm’s policy and performance.
One particular characteristic of personality, managerial overoptimism, has received par-
ticular attention. Malmendier and Tate (2005) establish that for overoptimistic managers
there is a strong relation between investment behavior and the availability of internal funds
and Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that, in mergers, overoptimistic CEOs overestimate
their ability to generate returns and overpay for target companies and undertake value-
destroying mergers. Ben-David et al. (2008) show that companies with overconﬁdent
CFOs have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent debt structure as compared to other ﬁrms.
Given the empirically strong eﬀects of overoptimism, I set up a model to highlight its
potential importance for management strategy and to rationalize why it makes sense for
a ﬁrm to hire overoptimistic managers. I demonstrate that personnel policy, i.e. selecting
the right managers (not only with respect to ability), may have an important impact on
the strategic position of ﬁrms in competition. By hiring an overoptimistic manager (i.e. an
“irrational” type) for strategic reasons, the ﬁrm can commit to act diﬀerently and gain an
advantage in competition. This follows the intuition from Schelling (1960): By delegating
certain tasks to agents with preferences diﬀerent from one’s own, one can make threats
credible that were not credible if oneself would act.
1The Wallstreet Journal, June 20, 2009, http : //online.wsj.com/article/SB124546193182433491.html
1Overoptimism and overconﬁdence have been a subject of study in (social) psychology
for decades. Already early on, the possible importance of these traits for businesses were
understood and studied. Bettman and Weitz (1983) ﬁnd evidence for self-serving bias, a
behavior where successes are accounted mainly to own ability whilst they are in fact mainly
due to luck, amongst executives in their analysis of annual reports. Overoptimism, where
people believe favorable events to be more likely than they actually are, is documented
extensively. Kidd and Morgan (1969) ﬁnd that electric utility managers consistently un-
derestimate the downtime of generating equipment. Larwood and Whittaker (1977) study
a sample of corporate presidents and ﬁnd them to be unrealistic in their predictions of suc-
cess. Cooper et al. (1988) study entrepreneurs who overestimate their chances of success
with their business. In their sample of 2994 entrepreneurs 81% believe their chances to
survive are better than 70% and 33% believe they will survive for sure. In reality, 75% of
new ventures did not survive the ﬁrst 5 years.
I analyze a duopoly model of price competition where the ﬁrms have the opportunity to
carry out cost-reducing R&D, i.e. pursue process innovations, to improve their competitive
situation before they enter into product market competition. The R&D stage is modeled
as a tournament, following Lazear and Rosen (1981), where the winner of the tournament,
i.e. the ﬁrm with lower costs, wins the market. A tournament is a simple way to capture
important aspects of oligopolistic competition, for example situations where ﬁrms have to
spend resources to attract customers, where ﬁrms compete for highly proﬁtable procure-
ment contracts from a public institution, or where ﬁrms compete in new markets with
network externalities where a standard has to be incorporated so that in the end there is
only one dominant ﬁrm (the winner). An overoptimistic manager believes the tournament
is biased in his favor and relaxes his eﬀorts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers
the ﬁrms can escape the rat race nature of these R&D tournaments. The result resembles
collusive behavior but is derived in a completely non-cooperative setting.
There exists a large related literature on strategic delegation. The classic literature on
strategic delegation analyzes how contract design can create commitment for managers. In
models of Cournot competition, Vickers (1985) shows that optimal contracts have elements
of relative performance evaluation, inducing the agent to act more aggressively and Fersht-
man (1985) provides an example that ﬁrm proﬁts increase if managerial incentive contracts
condition not only on proﬁts but also on sales. Fershtman and Judd (1987) extend this
analysis to diﬀerentiated Bertrand competition and show that owners there also have an
incentive to distort managerial incentives.
Recently this literature has been extended to the analysis of contests, tournaments and all-
pay auctions. Kr¨ akel (2002) models the competition between ﬁrms as a contest. He shows
2that under this setting owners may induce their managers to maximize sales and that there
is a ﬁrst-mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. Whether all
owners delegate their decisions to managers or not will endogenously depend on the type of
contest. In Kr¨ akel (2005), owners choose a linear combination of proﬁts and sales incentive
schemes for their managers before they compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each
other. Although initially the game is completely symmetric, other than in the classic cases
of Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly, there exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts
a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one. Similarly, Konrad et al. (2004)
show for a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction that buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding
to agents and to distort the agents’ incentives away from their own incentives. Again,
the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are initially
perfectly symmetric.
Delegation in oligopoly models with ex-ante investments has been studied by various au-
thors. Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Kopel and Riegler (2006), correcting a mistake in
Zhang and Zhang’s analysis, study Cournot competition with ex-ante cost-reducing R&D
with spillovers. They derive the structure of contracts conditioning on proﬁts and sales
and show that it is optimal for the ﬁrms to delegate the production and R&D decisions to
managers. Kr¨ akel (2004) considers oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic
delegation. He derives the structure of (proﬁts and sales) contracts and shows that, de-
pendent on the strength of R&D spillovers, a managerial ﬁrm may have a strong strategic
advantage when competing with an owner operated ﬁrm. Overvest and Veldman (2008)
study how an observable and veriﬁable contract that provides direct monetary incentives
for cost reductions can overcome the problem that cost-reducing investments may not be
publicly observable and thus cannot be used as strategic commitments. Englmaier (2010),
studying Cournot competition with ex-ante cost-reducing R&D and the option to delegate
to overoptimistic managers, is probably closest to this study. In his setting, both ﬁrms hire
overoptimistic managers.
My model is complementary to the above studies as I combine the analysis of Bertrand
competition with ex-ante cost-reducing R&D with a diﬀerent channel of delegation, the
degree of overoptimism. Extending the focus of delegation from purely distorting incentive
contracts to also considering richer personality attributes is of particular value in situations
where for some reasons, e.g. contractibility problems or regulatory restrictions, it is not
possible to use distorted contracts but selecting an overoptimistic manager may still be
a viable alternative. A novel feature in my model is that the optimal extent of strategic
delegation, i.e. the optimal degree of overoptimism, varies non-monotonically with the
riskiness of the underlying R&D technology. This has important implications for matching
3the right manager types to jobs and generates in principle testable predictions.
2 The Model
Consider two ﬁrms competing in prices for a unit mass of consumers with unit demand and
valuation v. Products are not diﬀerentiated, thus, consumers base their decisions solely
on prices. The marginal production cost of ﬁrm i, with i = 1,2, equals Ci = ci − θi − ǫi,
where θi ∈ [0,ci] is ﬁrm i’s cost reducing R&D investment and ǫi is a noise term, which is
i.i.d. across players and distributed according to G(·) on [−¯ ǫ,¯ ǫ]. To ease analysis, assume
v > max{c1 + ¯ ǫ,c2 + ¯ ǫ} and, to avoid Ci < 0, ci is large enough relative to ¯ ǫ. This R&D
technology resembles a tournament as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) where the winner is
determined depending on eﬀort and luck. The cost reducing R&D comes at a cost γ(θi)
with γ′(·) > 0 and γ′′(·) > 0.
Before price competition takes place and before the cost reducing R&D investments are
sunk, ﬁrms hire (possibly overoptimistic) managers who are responsible for the investment
decision. Overoptimism is modeled as follows: When the manager has to decide upon
the cost reducing investment, he believes that his ﬁrm has an (additional) initial cost
advantage of ki (with ki ∈ R+), e.g. due to a superior production technology. In tournament
terminology, both managers believe the tournament is biased in their favor. In fact the true
ki = 0. A formally equivalent interpretation of ki would be that the manager believes that
his ﬁrm’s product is vertically diﬀerentiated against his opponent’s product. Thus he can
charge a mark-up of ki in excess of the competitor’s price and consumers are still willing to
buy his product. I will use this latter interpretation in what follows. Hence ki is the direct
measure of overoptimism.
The manager gains private beneﬁts B, e.g. promotion prospects or beneﬁts of control, from
winning the tournament. One could also think of it as a simple bonus contract which would
be the optimal contract if staying in or exiting the market is the only veriﬁable performance
measure.2 Incentives are aligned as far as, ceteris paribus, winning the tournament is
preferred by ﬁrm owners, as the ﬁrm stays in the market, and the manager.
The timing of the model is as follows:
t = 0 Firms simultaneously hire (possibly overoptimistic) managers.
t = 1 Managers simultaneously determine their cost-reducing investments θ.
t = 2 Actual production costs Ci are realized and observed by all actors.
t = 3 Firms compete in prices.
2Note that such a bonus contract is, given the assumption on unit demand, equivalent to a pure incentive
contract on sales.
4Note that in t = 2 the overoptimism is resolved. I assume that when the managers observe
their own and the competitor’s true ﬁnal production costs they correctly process the new
information and take subsequently optimal pricing decisions.
To identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, I solve the game by backward induction.
t=3 - Price Competition: Given optimal price setting, in the price-competition stage
the proﬁts are given by
πi =
(
Cj − Ci − γ(θ∗
i) if Ci < Cj
−γ(θ∗
i) otherwise
.
Note that these proﬁts are independent of the absolute cost level but only depend on the
diﬀerence. Thus, ﬁrms would like to spend as little on R&D as possible.
t=2 - R&D Investment: In the R&D investment stage, the possibly overoptimistic
manager believes that consumers will buy his ﬁrm’s product as long as pi ≤ pj +ki. Given
the assumption on the incentives for the manager, the ﬁrm 1 manager (henceforth manager
1) maximizes
max
θ1
Pr(C1 > C2 + k1)B − γ(θ1)
⇐⇒
max
θ1
Pr(ǫ2 − ǫ1 < c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ(θ1).
Let z ≡ ǫ2 − ǫ1 be the convoluted distribution. z is distributed according to H(z) with
z ∈ [−2¯ ǫ,2¯ ǫ]. As standard in the tournament literature I make the following simplifying
assumptions:
(1) E(z) = 0
(2) ∀ˆ z : H(ˆ z) = 1 − H(−ˆ z)
Assumptions (1) and (2) imply that z is symmetrically distributed around 0. They are
satisﬁed e.g. if the ǫi are normally or uniformly distributed. I will present the problem
only from manager 1’s perspective. The reasoning for manager 2 is completely analogous.
Manager 1’s problem can be written as
max
θ1
H(c2 − ˜ θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ(θ1).
Manager 1’s optimal choice depends on which action, ˜ θ2, he thinks manager 2 will choose.
In the spirit of overoptimism, I assume that manager 1 thinks he is advantaged and be-
lieves that agent 2 agrees with his perception.3 Thus, manager 1 expects that manager 2
3This clearly violates Aumann’s impossibility result on agreeing to disagree. However, similar assumptions
are commonly invoked in the theoretical literature on overoptimism. In fact, the assumption captures an
essential aspect of overoptimism. See for example Van den Steen (2005).
5maximizes
max
˜ θ2
Pr(c2 − ˜ θ2 − ǫ2 < c1 − θ1 − ǫ1 − k1)B − γ(θ2)
⇐⇒
max
˜ θ2
{1 − H(c2 − ˜ θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)}B − γ(θ2)
The ﬁrst-order conditions of this game can be written as
h(c2 − ˜ θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ
′(θ1) = 0
h(c2 − ˜ θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1)B − γ
′(˜ θ2) = 0.
Rearranging and dividing yields
γ′(θ1)
γ′( ˜ θ2) = 1.
The above calculations give the standard result that equilibrium eﬀort levels coincide,
θ∗
1 = ˜ θ∗
2, where ˜ θ∗
2 is the eﬀort level manager 1 believes manager 2 chooses. Performing the
same reasoning for manager 2, I end up with the symmetric result θ∗
2 = ˜ θ∗
1.
From now on I will focus on the case where ﬁrms are initially identical, i.e. c1 = c2.
Furthermore, to ease exposition, I will assume that the cost of R&D investment is given
by γ(θi) = 1
2θ2
i. Using θ∗
i = ˜ θ∗
j in the two above ﬁrst-order conditions, equilibrium eﬀort is
given by
γ
′(θ
∗
i) = h(ki)B.
From the symmetry assumptions on H (·) and h(·) it follows that eﬀort decreases the
further ki is away from 0, i.e. the more the perceived bias in the tournament is.
t=1 - Hiring: I can use these results when analyzing the ﬁrm’s decision at the hiring
stage. In doing so, I will focus on symmetric equilibria. Given the agents’ eﬀort level, ﬁrm i
now maximizes over the type ki. I assume that there is a large supply of managers and the
degree of overoptimism is observable to ﬁrms. Firm 1’s proﬁt is the probability of winning,
Pr(ǫ2 − ǫ1 < c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1) = H(c2 − θ2 − c1 + θ1 + k1), times the expected proﬁt
in that case, θ1 − θ2, net of the investment costs, γ(θ1). Given the above assumptions and
results this proﬁt function can be rewritten and the hiring problem of ﬁrm 1 is given by 4
max
k1
H[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k1)B − h(k2)B] −
1
2
(h(k1)B)
2
and the resulting ﬁrst-order condition is given by
0 = h[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k1)B − h(k2)B]h
′(k1)B
+ H[h(k1)B − h(k2)B]h
′(k1)B − h(k1)Bh
′(k1)B.
4The respective conditions for ﬁrm 2 are given in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Convoluted Distributions
Canceling out h′(ki)B and focussing on symmetric equilibria imposes k1 = k2 which yields
h(0) · 0 + H(0) = h(k1)B.
Note that due to the above assumptions on symmetry H(0) = 1
2 holds and hence I get
h(k1) = h(k2) = 1
2B.
The θ∗
i a ﬁrm wants to implement is unaﬀected by B as θi = B · 1
2B = 1
2. Hence a
symmetric equilibrium exists in which the optimal degree of delegation is given by the
above equations.5 These equations do not uniquely characterize the exact equilibrium
values since h(·) is symmetric around 0 and therefore there exist two values of ki satisfying
the conditions above. However, inspecting the second-order conditions of the problem we
see that always an overoptimistic manager, i.e. ki > 0, will be hired.6
Proposition 1 In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the tournament model of oligopolis-
tic price-competition with cost-reducing R&D investments, ﬁrms always hire overoptimistic
managers.
The intuition for this result is that the overoptimistic managers allow the ﬁrms to curtail
R&D spending. It is noteworthy that I get this result though the managers are only
interested in winning the tournament.
To illustrate an interesting point, further assume that the error terms ǫi are uniformly
distributed on [−¯ ǫ,¯ ǫ]. This gives a triangular density function h(·) as shown in Figure 1.
If the tournament becomes more deterministic the triangular densities are contracted and
5To ensure existence I have to assume h(0) ≥ 1
2B. h(0) can be thought of measuring the importance of luck
for the outcome of the tournament. The higher h(0) is, the more deterministic is the tournament. Thus I
require the tournament to depend not too much on luck.
6See Appendix B for details.
7become steeper. Carefully inspecting Figure 1 shows that the optimal degree of delegation
is non-monotonic in the noisiness of the tournament. First, as the R&D tournament gets
less noisy the optimal degree of delegation increases, then, from some level onwards it
decreases again.
It is a standard result in tournament theory that eﬀort increases if luck is less important for
the outcome of the tournament. Starting from this and interpreting the result as follows
makes the intuition apparent: Starting from a noisy situation and decreasing the noise
increases the managers’ eﬀort levels. The ﬁrms are interested in keeping R&D spending
down and therefore hire more overoptimistic managers who are less prone to spend much
eﬀort. But the less noise is in the tournament, the more tempting it is to invest just a little
bit more to win the market almost certainly. In this situation it is too risky to stick with a
manager who thinks he has a competitive edge and be expropriated by the opponent ﬁrm.
Note that the basic eﬀect that delegation is most pronounced for an intermediate level of
noisiness carries over to more general than linear convoluted distributions. Proposition 2
summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 2 The optimal degree of managerial overoptimism is non–monotonic in the
riskiness of the tournament. When the R&D technology becomes less noisy the optimal
degree of overoptimism ﬁrst increases and then decreases again. Thus we should ﬁnd the
most overoptimistic types in industries with moderately risky R&D technologies.
3 Conclusion
My analysis has shown that in symmetric tournaments with ex-ante investments, delega-
tion to overoptimistic managers is the unique symmetric equilibrium. The overoptimistic
manager expects the product market to be more proﬁtable (diﬀerentiated) than it actually
is and hence overoptimism helps to commit to a speciﬁc R&D strategy. The model in
this paper delivers empirical predictions as I ﬁnd that the optimal degree of overoptimism
depends non-monotonically on the riskiness of the underlying R&D technology. In partic-
ular, overoptimistic managers are most valuable in industries with moderately risky R&D
technologies.
The results of the analysis are potentially important for management strategy as they
highlight the important eﬀect personnel selection, not only with respect to ability but also
other personality traits, may have on the strategic position of ﬁrms in competition. The
result, linking optimal delegation to underlying technology, shows the intricacy of match-
ing a speciﬁc task to the right manager type. Furthermore, I demonstrate an additional
8advantage of extending the focus of delegation from purely distorting contracts to consider-
ing richer personality attributes: In situations where for some reasons, e.g. contractibility
problems or regulatory restrictions, it is not possible to use distorted contracts, selecting
an overoptimistic manager may be a valuable alternative strategy.
To further shed light on organizational issues, it would be interesting to extend the model.
As the degree of overoptimism is a relevant characteristic of the manager, it makes sense to
further investigate how to adopt various other aspects of a ﬁrm’s organization to this trait.
For example, diﬀerent internal organizational structures may to a diﬀering degree give
rise to managerial overoptimism, respectively enable overoptimistic managers to succeed.
If these internal structures are chosen optimally, diﬀering internal organizational forms,
dependent on whether overoptimistic managers are beneﬁcial for the organization, are
optimal. Results along these lines would be in principle testable.
A Conditions for Firm 2
The hiring problem for ﬁrm 2 is given by
max
k2
{1 − H(h(k1)B − h(k2)B)}[h(k1)B − h(k2)B] −
1
2
(h(k2)B)
2.
Firm 2’s ﬁrst-order condition in the hiring stage
0 = h[h(k1)B − h(k2)B][h(k2)B − h(k1)B]h
′(k2)B
+ {1 − H(h(k1)B − h(k2)B)}h
′(k2)B − h(k2)Bh
′(k2)B.
Equilibrium condition for ﬁrm 2’s hiring decision:
h(0) · 0 + 1 − H(0) = h(k2)B.
B Second Order Conditions
Since B does not aﬀect the optimal choice of θi, I normalize it to one to ease notation.
A symmetric equilibrium exists in which the optimal degree of delegation is given by the
above derived equations
h(0) · 0 + H(0) = h(k1)
h(0) · 0 + 1 − H(0) = h(k2).
As H(0) = 1
2 I get h(k1) = h(k2) = 1
2B.
9Note that these equations do not uniquely characterize the exact equilibrium values since
h(·) is symmetric around 0 and therefore there may exist two values of ki satisfying the
conditions above. Inspecting the second-order conditions, however conﬁrms that only del-
egation to an overoptimistic type will occur in equilibrium.
The second-order condition for ﬁrm 1 is given by
∂2
∂k1∂k1
= h
′[h(k1) − h(k2)][h(k1) − h(k2)]h
′(k1) + h
′(k1)h[h(k1) − h(k2)]
+ h[h(k1) − h(k2)]h
′(k1) − h
′(k1),
which can be rearranged to
h
′(k1){h
′[h(k1) − h(k2)][h(k1) − h(k2)] + 2h[h(k1) − h(k2)] − 1}.
Now focus on the second-order condition at the symmetric solution to the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion. I obtain h′(k∗
1){2h(0)−1}. Since h(0) > 1
2 has to hold to ensure existence, h′(k∗
1) < 0
must hold for the second-order condition to be satisﬁed. Note that h′(·) < 0 only if ki > 0,
hence the result that k∗
1 > 0. The analogous argument applies to the second-order condition
of ﬁrm 2.
REFERENCES
Ben-David, I., J. Graham, and C. Harvey (2008) ’Managerial Overconﬁdence and Corporate
Policies,’ Working paper
Bennedsen, M., F. Perez-Gonzalez, and D. Wolfenzon (2007) ’Do CEOs Matter?,’ mimeo
Bertrand, M. and A. Schoar (2003) ’Managing With Style: The Eﬀect Of Managers On Firm
Policies,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118(4), pp. 1169-1208
Bettman, J. and B.A. Weitz (1983) ’Attributions in the Board Room: Causal Reasoning in
Corporate Annual Reports,’ Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, pp. 165-183
Cooper, A. C., C.Y. Woo and W.C. Dunkelberg (1988) ’Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for
Success,’ Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 3, pp. 97-108
Drucker, P. (1967) ’The Eﬀective Executive’, Harper Collins: New York
Englmaier, F. (2010) ’Managerial Optimism and Investment Choice,’ Managerial and Decision
Economics, forthcoming
Fershtman, C. (1985) ’Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment,’
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, pp. 245 - 253
Fershtman, C.and K.L. Judd (1987) ’Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly,’ American Economic
Review, Vol. 77, pp. 927 - 940
Graham, J., C. Harvey, and M. Puri (2008) ’Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions,’
mimeo
Kaplan, S.N., M. Klebanov, and M. Sorensen(2008) ’Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities
Matter?,’ mimeo
Kidd, J.B. and J.R. Morgan (1969) ’A Predictive Information System for Management,’ Opera-
tional Research Quaterly, pp. 149-170
10Konrad, K.A., W. Peters, and K. W¨ arneryd (2004) ’Delegation in ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions,’
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 25(5), pp. 283 - 290
Kopel, M. and C. Riegler (2006) “R&D in a Strategic Delegation Game Revisited: A Note,”
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 27(7), pp. 605 - 612
Kr¨ akel, M. (2002) ’Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests,’ Managerial and
Decision Economics, Vol. 23(8), pp. 461-470
Kr¨ akel, M. (2004) “R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests,” Managerial
and Decision Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 147-156
Kr¨ akel, M. (2005) ’Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments,’ Review of Economic Design,
Vol. 9(4), pp. 377-396
Larwood, L. and W. Whittaker (1977) ’Managerial myopia: self-serving biases in organizational
planning,’ Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 62, pp. 194-198
Lazear, E.P. and S. Rosen (1981) ’Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,’
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89(5), pp. 841-864
Malmendier, U. and G. A. Tate (2005) ’CEO Overconﬁdence and Corporate Investment,’ Journal
of Finance Vol. 60(6), pp. 2661-2700
Malmendier, U. and G. Tate (2008) ’Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconﬁdence and the
Market’s Reaction,’ Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89(1), pp. 20-43
Overvest, B.M. and J. Veldman (2008) “Managerial incentives for process innovation,” Manage-
rial and Decision Economics, Vol. 29(7), pp. 539 - 545
Schelling, T. (1960) ’The Strategy of Conﬂict,’ Harvard University Press/Cambridge, MA
Van den Steen, E. (2005) ’Organizations beliefs and managerial vision,’ Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organization, Vol. 21(1), pp. 256 - 283
Vickers, J. (1985) ’Delegation and the theory of the ﬁrm,’ Economic Journal, Vol. 95, pp. 138 -
147
Zhang, J. and Zhang, Z. (1997) “R&D in a strategic delegation game,” Managerial and Decision
Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 391 - 398
11